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Improving Army Test and Evaluation: A Team Sport
Institutional change is not merely about pinching pennies or pushing pens. And efficiencies are not simply about improving the bottom line. They're about doing things better, doing them smarter, and taking full advantage of the progress, technology, knowledge, and experience that we have available to us. As a result of these problems, Army leadership, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Congress and industry have lost trust in the Army's acquisition processes and capability to effectively provide Warfighters the equipment and services they require in a timely manner. Despite these struggles, the U.S. Army is still regarded as the best equipped and most technologically advanced army in the world. This can be attributed in part to overseas contingency operations funding and rapid acquisition processes employed during the last ten years which have delivered cutting edge 2 technologies to the battlefield. In light of the impending fiscal uncertainty and defense budget reductions, supplemental funding will soon come to a halt. As a result, the acquisition community must find more timely and efficient means to provide Warfighters the capabilities needed to remain the best equipped Army in the world. 3 The current uncertain fiscal environment facing the Nation forces the Army to revisit its approach to developing, acquiring and sustaining new acquisition systems.
This approach must result in the delivery of effective and reliable systems, but it must also be flexible and adaptive in its application such that timely decisions are made based on demonstrated performance and reasonable risk. This paper will analyze how the Army's test and evaluation efforts support the larger acquisition process, and it will identify areas of improvement to speed delivery of solutions to the Warfighter more efficiently and economically without compromising quality or accepting undue risk.
Background
The purpose of Army acquisition is to equip and sustain the Army so that it meets current and future mission requirements. The manner in which the Army does this is complex and is guided by 20 different statutes, 2,000 pages of regulations and other various policies. 4 The law requires materiel systems be procured through a three step process: 1) identifying the capability required, 2) establishing a budget to support the effort and 3) acquiring the system in accordance with the laws and guidelines of the Defense Acquisition System. 5 Successful implementation and execution requires that these processes be aligned.
Requirements are identified by the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Combatant
Commanders through a process known as the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). JCIDS assesses gaps in military capabilities and 3 recommends solutions to fill the gaps. It plays a key role in identifying the capabilities required by the Warfighters to support the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the National Military Strategy. The primary objective of the JCIDS process is to ensure that capabilities required by joint Warfighters to successfully execute the missions assigned to them are identified. The JCIDS process also identifies the operational performance criteria of capabilities required by the Joint Force. 6 The requirements process supports the acquisition process by providing validated capability needs and associated performance criteria to be used as a basis for acquiring the right systems. The budget is established through the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBE). The purpose of the PPBE process is to allocate resources within the Department of Defense. The process is a combination of four distinct sections: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution. PPBE is linked to the Defense Acquisition System by the financial resources it provides to acquisition programs. Upon initiation, an acquisition program identifies its resource requirements 4 over the life of the program. These requirements must be consistent with the resources that have been allocated by the PPBE process. As the program proceeds through the acquisition process, its budget requirements are updated. Any changes to budget requirements must be addressed through the PPBE process. Decisions that alter the program's budget request, whether through additional funding or funding cuts, have an effect on the program's execution. For instance, budget cuts could reduce the scope of a program; extend its schedule or both.
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The Defense Acquisition System is the process used to develop and purchase the desired system. The two guiding documents that outline this process are DoD Directive 5000.01 and 5000.02. DoD Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition
System, provides the policies and principles that govern the Defense Acquisition System. 10 DoD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, establishes the management framework that implements these policies and principles.
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The Defense Acquisition System is an event-based process where programs advance through several decision points and milestone reviews until ultimately being fielded to the Services.
Primary Participants in Defense Acquisition
The major participants in the acquisition process are Congress, Survivability in an operational context. ATEC's primary purpose is to provide independent information to decision makers to aid in acquisition decisions. 17 Although each organization has different missions, they all work together toward a common end -the delivery of effective, suitable and survivable systems. The following sections of this paper will focus on the interactions between OSD, PMOs, TCMs and ATEC representatives as they work towards fielding new equipment.
Introduction to Testing
"The primary purpose of test and evaluation (T&E) is to support system development and acquisition by serving as a feedback mechanism in the iterative systems engineering process." 18 ATEC's mission is to provide information to acquisition decision makers. Through testing, the T&E community determines if a system meets its specified requirements to ascertain whether it provides the military capability being sought. A variety of testing is planned and performed, from early contractor tests through rigorous operational tests, all designed to evaluate the progress of the program.
It is through testing that the Army validates the performance against the requirements identified during the JCIDS as outlined in the requirements documents (CDD or CPD).
These documents outline the threshold and objective requirements of a particular system as well as the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). The threshold requirement denotes the minimum acceptable requirements and the objective denotes the desired requirements. The KPP is the capability or characteristic that is so significant that failure to meet the threshold can be cause for the concept or system selection to be reevaluated or the program to be reassessed or terminated.
The Army evaluates system performance through the data derived from three Unique cultural characteristics exist among acquisition professionals. First and foremost, the acquisition community generally shares an overall attitude of optimism.
Optimistic characteristics are evident in such things as the schedules developed, assumptions made, approaches to working through problems encountered and forecasts of system performance. Whether responding to inquiries from Congress, the press or the public, most acquisition professionals downplay the significance of performance setbacks, cost overruns and schedule changes. 
Recent T&E Transformation
Throughout the years there have been extensive reviews and studies aimed at improving the acquisition system. These reviews and studies, which resulted in only minor improvements, have not eliminated the overall critique of the system that it is too time consuming, too costly and unable to deliver products that meet the technical parameters required. The challenge in transforming Army acquisition lays primarily in that MDAPs are extremely technologically advanced and complex. These programs are often designed to achieve performance levels never before realized. 25 Reform efforts such as WSARA instituted more reviewers in an already complex acquisition process.
More reviews add to the burden of program managers and equip more oversight agencies with veto authority. As a result, rather than streamlining the acquisition process, the process became more complex and time consuming.
The acquisition community has proven that in times of war it can deliver timely capabilities. This is primarily due to the fact that wars enable that community to streamline the acquisition process, allowing them to bypass some of the lengthy procedural delays that hinder traditional programs in peacetime. For instance, to respond to the urgent and rapid demand for systems to support the deployment in Iraq and Afghanistan, ATEC supported rapid acquisition by developing a new reporting process that stressed the identification and documentation of the equipment capabilities and limitations for decision makers and the users prior to fielding to theater. ATEC deployed Forward Operational Assessment teams, on six-month rotations, to Iraq, Kuwait, and Afghanistan to collect information on systems in order to identify and fix shortfalls so that systems could quickly fill the requests from operational commanders. 26 Through capabilities and limitation reports and safety confirmations, ATEC provided information to decision makers to support fielding decisions in a matter of months; far quicker than it takes for traditional acquisition programs.
Despite the ability of rapid acquisition programs to provide responsive capabilities to Warfighters, there are inherent problems and risks associated with this process. For example, rapid acquisition efforts rarely adequately address the DOTMLPF considerations, they often provide solutions to short term problems rather than long term ones, and they often fail to account for the life cycle sustainment plans and these components and determine the ability for these components to be fielded. Recommendations to Transform T&E Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Odierno commented that the greatest threat to our national security is fiscal uncertainty, but this uncertainty presents us with an opportunity to shape the Army of the future. 33 There is opportunity to improve test and evaluation. However, this opportunity requires the collective willingness of ATEC, PMOs, TCMs and OSD to work together under the guidance and parameters set forth by the Secretary of Defense to improve the acquisition process. As noted previously, the Army test community has made positive attempts to improve the way it conducts test and evaluation. However, more can be done with the cooperation of all stakeholders. Like ATEC, all organizations involved in Army acquisition need to take an introspective look and challenge their processes and their unique cultural characteristics that may inhibit making changes. There are no silver bullets that will fix the acquisition process, but the Army can take actions to improve test and evaluation. These actions fall into 7 categories:
 Allow for greater access to and use of contractor test data.
 Use adequate testing to confirm requirements.
 Increased accountability among stakeholders.
 Consolidate reviews and eliminate redundancy.
 Improve the requirements process.
 Support risk based testing.
 Include the T&E community in configuration steering boards.
Allow for Greater Access to and Use of Contractor Data
As previously mentioned, in some cases contractor test data can be used by government evaluators, eliminating the need to repeat the test using government resources. Even if the data is not sufficient, access to contractor data can serve to optimize government testing. For example, transportability tests or vulnerability tests could be optimized if government personnel had access to the contractor subcomponent and component tests. There is reluctance among contractors to allow access because government evaluators may use this data for negative reporting.
However, inserting language in the requests for proposal allowing for government access to contractor test data would lend to an increase in use and ease of obtainment of data.
Use Adequate Testing to Confirm Requirements
A continuing debate among acquisition professionals deals with the amount of rigor that should be applied to government testing. In one camp proponents of rigor argue that research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) represents less than 30% of a systems lifecycle costs. They argue that since 70% of a system's costs are operations and support, from a pure economic perspective, it is better to identify deficiencies and allow for fixes in the RDT&E phase rather than field unreliable systems that require much more costly fixes during the sustainment phase. This line of thinking led the test community to develop "robust" test plans that were effective in identifying the full capabilities and weaknesses of systems. These test plans were time consuming and costly and drew the attention of senior decision makers aimed at conducting tests more efficiently, which then led the test community to develop "adequate" test plans. 
Risk-Based Testing and Decision-Making
The entire acquisition community, testers, PMO and force developers, needs to develop an agile framework that guides decision-making. The DoDI 5000.02 outlines a management system designed to reduce risk to the greatest extent possible so that decision-makers can make the best decisions on materiel acquisitions. However, DoDI 5000.02 should not be the management system that guides all system acquisitions.
Many materiel solutions are upgrades to existing systems that are low risk initiatives.
These cases should be handled differently than high risk evolutionary ventures. In cases of system upgrades and commercial-off-the-shelf procurement, the test community needs to more readily accept previous test data and accept modeling and simulation data, thereby reducing costs and the acquisition timeline.
Include the T&E Community in Configuration Steering Boards
Configuration Steering Boards (CSB) were instituted as a means to limit requirements changes and avoid cost increases to programs. The attendee list at CSBs are intended to be broad as the board reviews the requirements and configuration changes that have the potential to impact programs. However, the Service test community is rarely invited to participate. The agendas of CSBs typically consist of requirements overview, cost and affordability, schedule review, de-scoping suggestions and management initiatives. There is rarely an opportunity for the Army's independent 22 test agency to discuss emerging results of the tests performed to date. Providing the test community a seat at the CSB would enable them to provide input on how the descoping proposals could impact both the future tests and the evaluation reports, which would be beneficial to the CSB chairperson. There are cases where de-scoping initiatives did not achieve their intended results because they failed to take into consideration other aspects of the systems requirements, such as reliability, which were the primary drivers of the test and evaluation program. Allowing the test community to participate in the full CSB process will provide decision-makers with greater information and insight.
Conclusion
The Army must continue to challenge the processes and procedures it uses to acquire materiel solutions. Reliance on old practices employed in periods of economic prosperity is unaffordable. However, successfully changing processes and procedures requires buy-in and synchronization across multiple echelons of command and across diverse management structures. Although each share a common endstate, the participants in the Defense Acquisition System have unique responsibilities, varying interpretation of risk, differing time horizons, and competing priorities. The system also requires strong leaders who are willing to challenge the status quo, make tough decisions and be accountable for their actions. Senior civilians and officers who develop the momentum to affect change are often followed by those who are influenced by differing priorities.
Program managers, TRADOC capability mangers and T&E personnel have worked through challenges in order to deliver systems that provide the Warfighter the technology edge on the battlefield. These three communities must now work together to
